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Abstract
[Excerpt] The twenty years since 1989 have brought two major developments in worker activism. First,
whereas workers were part of the mass uprising in the Tiananmen movement, albeit as subordinate partners to
the students, labor activism since then has been almost entirely confined to the working class. While the ranks
of aggrieved workers have proliferated (expanding from workers in the state-owned sector to include migrant
workers) and the forms and incidents of labor activism have multiplied, there is hardly any sign of
mobilization that transcends class or regional lines.
Second, we observe that a long-term decline in worker power at the point of production – power that was
previously institutionalized in skill hierarchies, union representation, democratic management, permanent or
long-term employment, and other conditions of service constitutive of the socialist social contract - is going
on even as workers gain more power (at least on paper) outside the workplace. New labor laws have
broadened workers' rights and expanded administrative and judicial channels for resolving labor conflicts.
These legal and bureaucratic procedures have atomized and depoliticized labor activism even as they have
engendered and intensified mobilization outside official limits.
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The twenty years since 1989 have brought two major developments in worker activism. First, 
whereas workers were part of the mass uprising in the Tiananmen movement, albeit as subordinate 
partners to the students, labor activism since then has been almost entirely confined to the working 
class. While the ranks of aggrieved workers have proliferated (expanding from workers in the state-
owned sector to include migrant workers) and the forms and incidents of labor activism have multiplied, 
there is hardly any sign of mobilization that transcends class or regional lines. 
Second, we observe that a long-term decline in worker power at the point of p roduc t i on -
power that was previously institutionalized in skill hierarchies, union representation, democratic 
management, permanent or long-term employment, and other conditions of service constitutive of the 
socialist social contract—is going on even as workers gain more power (at least on paper) outside the 
workplace. New labor laws have broadened workers' rights and expanded administrative and judicial 
channels for resolving labor conflicts. These legal and bureaucratic procedures have atomized and 
depoliticized labor activism even as they have engendered and intensified mobilization outside official 
limits. 
The political and economic conditions that once enabled workers to join students in rebellion 
have disappeared. The bloody crackdown that began in Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989 disheartened 
many reform minded intellectuals, who have since dropped the idea that a mass movement can be a 
vehicle for political change. The government's decisive turn toward economic liberalization as a 
response to the legitimacy crisis and social discontents that underlay the Tiananmen Uprising 
rearranged the interests of various classes. In the 1990s, market reform began to benefit a much wider 
segment of the Chinese populace, most significantly the educated and the entrepreneurs, even as 
officials of the communist party-state continued to profit heavily from their bureaucratic positions and 
connections. 
China's working class has become more internally varied, and different parts of it have faced 
different challenges as economic change has moved ahead. For instance, wi th a massive influx of foreign 
capital and expansion of the private economy came the formation of a large pool of migrant laborers 
who now total almost 130 million people, or roughly 10 percent of China's total population. In the mid-
1990s, the "restructuring" (read: privatization and bankruptcy) of many state-owned industrial concerns, 
together with labor reforms that involved replacing permanent wi th contract employment, unleashed a 
decade-long spell of high unemployment. During this period, state and collective firms shed some 45 
million urban workers. In the meantime, casualization of employment, a worldwide trend, proceeded 
apace even in core industries such as automobile manufacturing. Today, self-employed, part-time, 
temporary, and casual workers account for about 40 percent of the urban working population, and 
workers as a whole have little bargaining power. Nonetheless, anger at unpaid wages, pension arrears, 
plant closures, and poor working conditions has continued to give rise to labor unrest, albeit of an 
overwhelmingly local character. 
Within the working class, the urban-rural division has persisted. Different household-registration 
statuses entail different provisions for workers' subsistence beyond wage employment, and thus have 
the effect of creating distinct interest groups within the working class. State and nonstate workers, not 
surprisingly, tend to take different approaches to collective action. Finally, the state's resolute use of 
repression against anything that smacks of labor activism across enterprises further inhibits the rise of a 
broad-based working-class movement. 
Workplace Disempowerment and Legal Empowerment 
The changing role of the official union speaks volumes about the disempowerment that China's 
people have suffered at work. The All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) was affected by the 
same ferment that swept large swaths of Chinese society during the first half of 1989. During this t ime, 
internal talk concerning greater union autonomy heated up, while some ACFTU officials met wi th 
student leaders and expressed support for independent unions.1 Yet as happened in so many other 
corners of national life, the massacre of June 4 put a dramatic end to open discussions of greater 
liberalization within the trade union. Since that t ime, no union leaders have dared to openly question 
the formal subordination of the ACFTU to the Chinese Communist Party. This means that in addition to 
protecting the rights and interests of workers, the state's goals of preserving social stability and 
promoting economic development have been firmly established as primary tasks of unions. As a result, 
the ACFTU has been limited to promoting workers' interests within a rather strict and externally defined 
set of legal and administrative constraints—a scenario that bespeaks a severe lack of substantive worker 
representation on the shop floor. 
The extreme powerlessness of the Chinese worker as a direct producer is also grotesquely 
illustrated by the rampant problem of wage nonpayment. An authoritative national survey released by 
the State Council found that in 2006 less than half (48 percent) of the migrant workforce got paid 
regularly, while 52 percent reported regular or occasional nonpayment of wages.2 The fact that wage 
collection for migrant workers became the subject of Premier Wen Jiabao's personal crusade in 2004 
threw into sharp relief the lack of institutional protections for workers. China's labor standards have 
plunged to new depths, descending from a notoriously low wage regime to a subsistence crisis caused 
by workers not getting paid for their labor. 
If the Chinese government has seemingly ceded control over the workplace to foreign and 
domestic capital (while state-owned enterprises increasingly utilize capitalist-style managerial regimes), 
it has also presided over an empowerment process through the promulgation of laws that give workers 
new legal rights. These include: the National Labor Law (1995), the Trade Union Law (2001), the Labor 
Contract Law (2007), the Labor Mediation and Arbitration Law (2007), and the Employment Promotion 
Law (2007). Ironically, empowering workers as juridical individuals exercising contractual rights does not 
resolve the problem of workers' powerlessness in the labor process. Workers can only seek redress after 
the fact, and remain at the mercy of the capricious (in) efficiency and political will of the Labor Bureau 
and the courts. 
Therefore, the increase in the amount of labor legislation seems to have coincided with higher 
numbers of labor violations, labor disputes referred for arbitration, and lawsuits, wi th little evidence 
that any of this is resulting in improved working conditions. The rise of rights consciousness is 
outgrowing institutional capacity to meet or contain workers' demands. Workers have more rights on 
paper—and are more aware of them—than ever before. But in reality they have little leverage in their 
places of employment, and the protection that their interests receive from the courts and the 
government is uneven at best. Not surprisingly, worker protests do not look as if they will disappear 
from Chinese life anytime soon. 
One historical condition for the stunning success that China's version of authoritarian capitalism 
has registered over the past thirty years has been the growth of a global neoliberal regime of 
increasingly free trade and capital flows. This has created an influx of investment, insatiable demand for 
Chinese products, employment opportunities for Chinese workers, and room for the Chinese economy 
to grow by putting the squeeze on labor. But this way of doing things may be reaching a point of 
exhaustion. The global financial and economic crisis is pushing the fundamental problem—the 
dispossession of workers as direct producers—to the surface, testing the limits of the Chinese approach 
to development. If uneven decentralized accumulation has thus far kept labor unrest too spread out and 
particularized to pose a threat to the system as a whole, then massive and simultaneous factory closings 
triggered by the latest global downturn may foment qualitatively different kinds of labor activism. 
Even before the crisis arrived in the second half of 2008, some grassroots Chinese unions were 
finding themselves compelled by their members' wretched subjugation to devise new modes of 
organization and activism. There are now indications that some enterprise-level trade union chairs are 
engaging in active, if still highly legalistic, defenses of their members' interests. Of particular note has 
been the serious effort of union chairs in Wal-Mart stores in both Nanchang and Shenzhen to press 
management through collective-bargaining tactics. Top officials of both the CCP and the ACFTU have 
expressed the wish that unions will pursue collective bargaining—the idea being that this will help to 
reduce pressure for more radical forms of activism. Yet both the Wal-Mart case and other examples 
from around China demonstrate that those higher up in the trade-unions' hierarchies are supportive of 
grassroots activism only to a point; enterprise-level labor leaders who push management too hard risk 
being seen as "unharmonious" and losing state backing. 
In short, the question now is whether China can make the transition from a labor-squeezing 
strategy of development to a more expansive method that provides the benefits of rights, the rule of 
law, and basic protections for labor to all the country's workers. The strengthening and expansion of 
rationalized mechanisms of collective bargaining, and perhaps even some provision for lawful strikes, 
are options that the government—always anxious to prevent instability—is considering. But this would 
require giving up the belief that social conflict can be legislated or administered out of existence, and 
would also entail the emergence of the new working class as a far more organized political force than it 
is today—a prospect that terrifies most Communist Party leaders. In the long run, however, this type of 
rationalized contention could provide the foundation for a more stable and sustainable form of 
capitalism in China. 
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